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Abstract
We set up a simple political economy model where economic integration raises the
profitability of multinational firms. In this setting redistributive taxation may rise
following economic integration, if the eﬀects of the widened income gap dominate
the higher excess burden of the tax.
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1 Introduction
It has been argued that increasing capital mobility will lead governments to undercut
each other’s capital income tax rates, resulting in underprovision of public goods as well
as relatively higher taxes on immobile factors (see Wilson, 1999 for a survey). Empirical
evidence in support of the theoretical predictions is mixed, however. On the one hand
statutory corporate tax rates have been significantly reduced since the 1980s, but on the
other hand tax bases have simultaneously been broadened. As a consequence, eﬀective
tax rates on profits have fallen by much less than statutory rates and in several coun-
tries they have not fallen at all (see Devereux, Griﬃth and Klemm, 2002). Moreover,
econometric studies provide some evidence of a negative relationship between corporate
tax rates and diﬀerent measures of economic integration. This relationship, however, is
generally not robust to the precise specification used in the empirical model (see Rodrik,
1997; Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Slemrod, 2004). The eﬀect of economic integration
on the level of public good supply is even less in accordance with the standard tax com-
petition model. Rodrik (1998) as well as several empirical studies in the political science
literature (see Swank and Steinmo, 2002 for a recent synthesis) find that globalisation
increases, rather than reduces, the total size of the welfare state.
One possible reason for this divergence between theoretical and empirical results is
that tax base mobility and economic integration have been accompanied by changes in
the primary distribution of factor incomes. Economic integration, therefore, may increase
the profits of multinational firms, either because it reduces the cost of intra-firm trade
or because it allows the firm to produce with cheaper inputs (Helpman and Krugman,
1985). While the eﬀect of economic integration on the profitability of multinational
firms, in particular, has been an important topic in the international trade literature (e.g.
Markusen, 2002), the existing literature on international taxation has usually taken the
distribution of gross-of-tax factor earnings as given. This also applies to political economy
models where the working majority is able to partly oﬀset the downward pressure on
capital tax rates, but economic integration still leads, in equilibrium, to an unambiguous
decline in the level of redistributive taxation (Persson and Tabellini, 1992; Gottschalk
and Peters, 2003.).
In this paper we incorporate rising profitability of a multinational firm, caused by
economic integration, into a simple political economy model with an internationally
mobile profit tax base. Our stylized model allows to derive reduced-form expression
for the optimal redistributive tax rate in the political-economic equilibrium. In this
framework globalisation increases both the redistributive gains, but also the eﬃciency
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costs of taxation from the perspective of the median voter. Hence economic integration
has a fundamentally ambiguous eﬀect on the redistributive tax rate in the political
economy equilibrium.
2 The model
We consider a small open economy with two types of individuals, rich capitalists (index
R) and poor workers (index P ). Each individual exogenously supplies one unit of the
numeraire good labour so that wage income equals unity for both the rich and the poor.
Poor individuals receive wage income only, whilst rich individuals receive additional profit
income (π) from a multinational firm. The profit income is initially taken as exogenous,
but will later be endogenised and linked to economic integration. The home country
levies a proportional, comprehensive income tax (t) on wage and profit incomes. The
representative firm can shift a share β of its profits to a low-tax country, which has a tax
rate t∗ < t. It is costly to engage in transfer pricing and the costs of profit shifting are
convex in the total amount of profits shifted; C (α,β,π) = (β π)2 /2α, where 1/α > 0 is
a parameter for the costs of profit shifting.
The after-tax income of the rich household is
IR = [1 + (1− β)π] (1− t) + βπ(1− t∗)− (β π)
2
2α
, (1)
where the first term is the after-tax income from wages and profit income reported at
home, the second term is after-tax income from profits reported abroad, and the last
term gives the costs of income shifting. Maximizing (1) with respect to the share of
profits shifted to the low tax country (β) yields
β =
α (t− t∗)
π
. (2)
Poor workers make up the majority of voters, and we normalize the total population
to unity. There are μ workers and (1−μ) capitalists, where 1 > μ > 0.5. The proportional
income tax falls on the wage income of both income groups and on the share of profit
income of the rich that is reported domestically. Using the multinational firm’s optimal
tax avoidance policy (2), total and per capita tax revenues are
T = t {1 + (1− μ) [π − α (t− t∗)]} . (3)
A representative poor individual derives utility from her after-tax income (1− t) and
a quasi-private public good. There are no economies of scale in the provision of the public
good, thus making our results comparable for countries of diﬀerent size. Both the private
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and the public good enter the poor individual’s utility function linearly.1 The constant
marginal benefit of the public good is γ < 1, implying that the poor individual suﬀers
a utility loss when one unit of her private consumption is exchanged for one unit of the
public good. With these specifications, and using (3), the utility of a poor individual is
UP = (1− t) + γt {1 + (1− μ) [π − α (t− t∗)]} . (4)
Given that the median voter is a poor individual, the equilibrium policy maximizes
UP with respect to the proportional income tax t. This yields an equilibrium tax rate of
t =
γ [1 + (1− μ)(π + α t∗)]− 1
2α γ (1− μ) . (5)
The equilibrium tax rate is positive, if the value of additional units of the public good
that is financed by the tax contributions of the rich, γ(1−μ)(π+αt∗), exceeds the utility
loss for the poor individual of transforming one unit of private income into one unit of
the public good (γ − 1 < 0). This is assumed in what follows.
Our simple model yields several comparative static results.2 In particular, changing
tax base mobility, as given by the ease with which multinationals can shift profits between
jurisdictions (α), yields
∂t
∂α
=
1− γ[1 + (1− μ)π]
2γ(1− μ)α2 =
t∗ − 2t
2α
< 0, (6)
since t∗ < t. Hence lower costs of profit shifting reduce the equilibrium tax rate.
On the other hand, the eﬀect of an exogenous change in profit income on the tax rate
is
∂t
∂π
=
1
2α
> 0. (7)
Thus an increase multinational profit income unambiguously raises the redistributive
gains from the proportional income tax. These eﬀects are summarized in
Proposition 1 The equilibrium level of a redistributive income tax is rising in (i) the
cost parameter for profit shifting (1/α); (ii) the level of profit income (π).
The next section combines these two eﬀects and links them to economic integration.
1A well-defined optimal tax rate is obtained in our model, despite the linearity of the objective
function in both arguments, because the excess burden of taxation is strictly convex in the tax rate.
2It is directly inferred from (5) that the home country’s optimal tax rate will rise if either the foreign
tax rate t∗ rises, or if the preference parameter for public goods (γ) is increased.
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3 Economic integration
A standard eﬀect analysed in the tax competition literature is that economic integration
increases the mobility of the capital tax base. In our setting this corresponds to an
increase in α, which lowers the costs of shifting profits to the foreign country.3 The
increased mobility of the capital tax base is not the only eﬀect of globalisation, however.
A common result in the modern trade literature is that economic integration increases
the profits of multinational firms, either because it reduces the cost of intra-firm trade
or because it allows the firm to produce with cheaper inputs, in particular lower costs of
labour (Helpman and Krugman, 1985).
The simplest way to capture these eﬀects is to consider a monopolist who sells output
at price p in its home market. Inverse demand is given by the linear function p = a−(x+
x∗), where a > 0 is a market size parameter and aggregate output can either be produced
at home (x) or abroad (x∗). In each country, one unit of (internationally immobile) labour
produces one unit of output. The exogenous wage rates and therefore the unit costs of
production are w in the home country and w∗ abroad, where w∗ < w. Producing abroad
adds extra transport costs for the firm. By analogy to the costs of profit shifting, we
model these costs as being quadratic in the volume of foreign production, D = (x∗)2/2α.4
Hence the transaction costs of producing abroad are reduced by economic integration.
The monopolist’s profits are then given by π = (a−x−x∗)(x+x∗)−wx−w∗x∗−(x∗)2/(2α).
Diﬀerentiating yields the profit-maximizing levels of production at home and abroad,
x = [a − w − 2α(w − w∗)]/2, x∗ = α(w − w∗). Substituting this back into the profit
function yields maximized profits π˜ = (a− w)2/4 + α (w − w∗)2/2.
The eﬀect of economic integration on the multinational firm’s profits are then given
by
∂π˜
∂α
=
(w − w∗)2
2
. (8)
Hence economic integration increases both the level and the elasticity of the multinational
firm’s profits. Following a common procedure in the literature (see Gresik, 2001), we
assume that the profit shifting decision can be separated from the decision of where to
produce. In this case the eﬀects on the optimal redistributive tax rate can simply be
3For example, it may be argued that the representative firm in our model undertakes both domestic
and foreign operations. As integration proceeds, a larger share of profits derives from international
operations, where profits can be shifted abroad.
4Transport costs are interpreted in a wide sense, including administrative hurdles and information
costs. The assumption that these costs are convex in the size of the foreign production unit corresponds
to some of the findings in the new theory of the multinational firm (e.g. Marin and Verdier, 2003).
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added up. Using (6), (7) and (8), the total eﬀect is given by
dt
dα
=
∂t
∂α
+
∂t
∂π
∂π˜
∂α
=
2(t∗ − 2t) + (w − w∗)2
4α
(9)
The first eﬀect in equation (9) is the direct eﬀect of increased tax base mobility, which
is unambiguously negative. The second eﬀect, which works through the change in the
profit level of the multinational firm, is instead positive. Hence economic integration
may either raise or lower the redistributive tax rate chosen by the median voter. The
increased sensitivity of the tax base will be the dominant eﬀect of economic integration if
the international tax diﬀerential is large and the motive for international profit shifting
is accordingly strong. In contrast, if the international wage diﬀerential is large, then the
increased profitability of the multinational firm will be the principal eﬀect of economic
integration. Our results are summarised in
Proposition 2 Economic integration will tend to increase the redistributive income tax
rate, if (i) the tax diﬀerential between the home and the foreign country is small; and
(ii) the wage diﬀerential between the domestic and the foreign country is large.
4 Conclusion
The possibility that economic integration may increase the tax rate is not present in
standard models of tax competition, where the eﬀects of globalisation are confined to in-
creased tax base mobility (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1992). Here we have incorporated,
in the simplest possible way, the stylized fact that economic integration is simultaneously
accompanied by an increase in the gross profitability of firms. Despite the simplicity of
our model, this additional model element introduces a fundamental ambiguity into the
relationship between economic integration and the level of redistributive taxation. This
finding may provide a simple way to reconcile the results from the theoretical tax com-
petition literature with the mixed empirical findings quoted in the introduction. For
empirical work this suggests that a robustly negative eﬀect of globalisation on the redis-
tributive tax rate can only be expected, if the level of pre-tax profitability is controlled
for.
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